
#### IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION



#### NOTICE OF FILING CONFIRMATION HEARING CLOSING DEMONSTRATIVE

On May 15, 2023, a trial (the "<u>Confirmation Hearing</u>") commenced in the above-captioned adversary proceeding and chapter 11 cases regarding the *Second Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC and Its Affiliated Debtors* [Docket No. 977] (the "<u>Plan</u>") and the claims in the adversary proceeding.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases, along with the last four digits of each Debtor's federal tax identification number, are as follows: Dawn Intermediate, LLC (6123); Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC (1874); Serta International Holdco, LLC (6101); National Bedding Company L.L.C. (0695); SSB Manufacturing Company (5743); The Simmons Manufacturing Co., LLC (0960); Dreamwell, Ltd. (2419); SSB Hospitality, LLC (2016); SSB Logistics, LLC (6691); Simmons Bedding Company, LLC (2552); Tuft & Needle, LLC (6215); Tomorrow Sleep LLC (0678); SSB Retail, LLC (9245); and World of Sleep Outlets, LLC (0957). The Debtors' corporate headquarters and service address for these chapter 11 cases is 2451 Industry Avenue, Doraville, Georgia 30360.

The Confirmation Hearing concluded with closing arguments taking place on May 25, 2023 starting at 2:00 p.m. (prevailing Central Time), at which counsel for the PTL Lenders<sup>2</sup> presented the demonstrative attached hereto as **Exhibit A**.

References to "PTL Lenders" include both the Lender Plaintiffs-Counterclaim Defendants, as well as the Additional Counterclaim Defendants that have responded to Counterclaim Plaintiffs' counterclaims. *See* ECF Nos. 217 & 220, Adv. No. 23-9001.

Dated: May 25, 2023 Houston, Texas

#### Respectfully submitted,

#### /s/ Gregg Costa

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

Gregg Costa (24028160)

Samuel D. Adkisson (24131212)

811 Main Street, Suite 3000

Houston, TX 77002

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C. Lee Wilson (admitted pro hac vice)

Akiva Shapiro (pro hac vice pending)

Amanda M. Aycock (admitted pro hac vice)

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clwilson@gibsondunn.com ashapiro@gibsondunn.com aaycock@gibsondunn.com aperloff-giles@gibsondunn.com

Counsel for Plaintiffs Invesco Senior Secured Management, Inc., Boston Management and Research, Credit Suisse Asset Management, LLC, Eaton Vance Management, and Barings, LLC and Represented Additional Counterclaim Defendants

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that, on May 25, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served by the Electronic Case Filing System for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, and will be served as set forth in the Affidavit of Service to be filed by the Debtors' claims, noticing, and solicitation agent.

/s/ Bruce J. Ruzinsky
Bruce J. Ruzinsky

#### Exhibit A

# Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC, et al. v. AG Centre Street Partnership L.P., et al.

United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of Texas
Honorable David R. Jones

# **Priority Lenders' Closing Argument**

Thursday, May 25, 2023

# **WORDS OF CONTRACTS**

# SEEK PROFIT & PREVENT LOSS

# Case 2310 Lenders Closing Argument 316 Citosing Argument

Reliance On The Words Of Contracts Parties Understood PETs Were Possible And Permitted **Business Justification** Defendants' Arguments Fall Short

# Case PT200 Lenders Closing Argument of 70

Reliance On The Words Of Contracts Defendants' Arguments Fall Short

**Implied Covenant Is A Narrow Doctrine** 

The implied duty must arise from the contract \*\*

Cordero v. Transamerica Annuity Service Corp.,

--- N.E.3d ---, 2023 WL 3061503, at \*5 (N.Y. Apr. 25, 2023)

#### **Covenant Cannot Override Contract**

It cannot be a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to do what a contract explicitly authorizes a party to do.

JN Contemporary Art LLC v. Phillips Auctioneers LLC, 507 F. Supp. 3d 490, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)

**Especially Narrow For Sophisticated Parties** 

It is not the place of the Court to imply . . . a provision after the fact when sophisticated, counseled businesspeople did not explicitly include it.

Wagner v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 2011 WL 856262, at \*5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2011)

#### **Court Ruled 2020 Transaction Is An Open Market Purchase**

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

SERTA SIMMONS BEDDING, LLC, S CASE NO. 23-09001-ADV
ET AL S HOUSTON, TEXAS
S TUESDAY,

§ MARCH 28, 2023

In looking at what occurred, it's very clear to me that this is what was intended by the agreements. It's what's intended by a concept of an open market purchase.

935 Eldridge Road, #144
Sugar Land, TX 71478
281-277-5325
www.judicialtranscribers.com


Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording,
transcript produced by transcription service.

JUDICIAL TRANSCRIBERS OF TEXAS, LLC

#### No Absolute Right to Pro Rata Treatment: "Open Market Purchases" Expressly Carved Out

Case 23-90020 Section 2.18. Payments Generally, Allocation of Proceeds, Sharing of Payments. Case 23-090 If any Lender obtains payment (whether voluntary, involuntary, through the exercise of any right of set-off or otherwise) in respect of any principal of or interest on any of its Loans of any Class held by it resulting in such Lender receiving payment of a greater proportion of the aggregate amount of its Loans of such Class and accrued interest thereon than the proportion received by any other Lender with Loans of such Class, then the Lender receiving such greater proportion shall purchase (for Cash at face value) participations in the Loans of other Lenders of such Class at such time outstanding to the extent necessary so that the benefit of all such payments shall be shared by the Lenders of such Class ratably in accordance with the aggregate amount of principal of and accrued interest on their respective Loans of such Class; provided that (i) if any such participations are purchased and all or any portion of the payment giving rise thereto is recovered, such participations shall be rescinded and the purchase price restored to the extent of such recovery, without interest, and (ii) the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to (A) any payment made by any Borrower pursuant to and in accordance with the express terms of this Agreement or (B) any payment obtained by any Lender as consideration for the assignment of or sale of a participation in any of its Loans to any permitted assignee or participant, including any payment made or deemed made in connection with Sections 2.22, 2.23, 9.02(c) and/or Section 9.05. Each Borrower consents to the foregoing and agrees, to the extent it may

#### No Absolute Right to Pro Rata Treatment: "Open Market Purchases" Expressly Carved Out



Debtors' Ex. 5 (ECF No. 853-5) §§ 9.02(b)(A)(6), 9.05(g)

# Implied Covenant Claims Are Duplicative





# Case PT200 Lenders Closing Argument of 70

Parties Understood PETs Were Possible And Permitted Defendants' Arguments Fall Short



KARN CHOPRA

CENTER VIEW PARTNERS

"In 2016, we were actually just coming out of a relatively aggressive period of liability management transactions from the wave of distress in oil and gas companies. . . . The 2016 term loan had numerous borrower friendly terms that were consistent with terms being negotiated in leveraged loan market at the time."

Trial Tr. 5/16 PM 199:22–200:4 (ECF No. 957)



ANDREW N. SVEEN



Trial Tr. 5/17 AM 96:12–14 (ECF No. 964) "[T]he Serta credit agreement in 2016 was loose, and . . . that wasn't unusual for that time frame."



MICHAEL SEARLES



Trial Tr. 5/17 PM 35:8–11 (ECF No. 966) "We understood the document was fairly loose and gave the company significant flexibility with respect to a liability management transaction."



**PHILIP YARROW** 

"And when you have looser credit agreements . . . you're taking a lot more risk that if the company doesn't perform as you expect, then there's a lot more chance that you could see collateral moved away from you or the sponsor trying to leak money away from you."



Trial Tr. 5/17 PM 104:8–12 (ECF No. 966)



Defendants Presented No Evidence To The Contrary



THEO KWON

# APOLLO

Trial Tr. 5/18 AM 56:23–57:4 (ECF No. 967)

- Q. And you concluded that the credit agreement, the 2016 credit agreement, was very loose, right?
- A. Correct.
- Q. And by 'loose,' you mean company friendly, right?
- **A.** Company friendly with the respect to the ability to move assets and execute liability management transactions that we had seen in the market, yes.



MICHAEL HANIGAN



Can't remember "ever focusing on 9.05(g) before buying the debt." Trial Tr. 5/18 PM 35:1–3 (ECF No. 968)

"No experience" with "open market purchase" provisions. Trial Tr. 5/18 PM 34:15–17 (ECF No. 968)

Agrees "people would have expected" a drop-down PET. Trial Tr. 5/18 PM 36:3-5 (ECF No. 968)



**JACOB GLADSTONE** 



Depo. Tr. 63:3–66:24 (Debtors' Ex. 372, ECF No. 941)

- No Angelo Gordon witness testified at trial
- Deposition witness not main employee on transaction
- Deposition testimony:

Angelo Gordon proposed a PET dropdown transaction to Serta's sponsor, Advent, on March 4, 2020.



DRAFT - FOR INTERNAL PURPOSES ONLY



Serta Simmons ("SSB") Recap


January 2020 • Serta Simmons • Bryce & Austin

#### **Thesis**

- While struggling from various industry wide factors especially mattress-in-a-box ("MiB"), the Serta and Simmons brands carry high brand awareness
- Loose credit documents may present a liability management solution anchored by IP / brand value

#### Control (-):

 Weak credit agreements strip standard 1L protections; maturities in 2023 / 24 also weaken control



Debtors' Ex. 43 (ECF No. 861-37) at 1

## **Drop-Down Group Made Similar Proposal**

	Drop-Down Proposal
Relied on the Open Market Purchase Provision	
Privately Negotiated	
Required New Credit Agreement	
Participation Limited	
Participants Prioritized in Default Scenario	
Debt Repurchased at Above Secondary Market Trading Pric	e 🚺

#### **Defendants Did Similar Deals**





#### FIRST LIEN CREDIT AGREEMENT

dated as of November 30, 2018

among

MLN TopCo Ltd., as Holdings,

MLN UK HoldCo Limited, as Intermediate Holdings,

MLN US TopCo Inc., as U.S. Holdings,

MLN US HoldCo LLC, as Borrower.

THE LENDERS AND ISSUING BANKS PARTY HERETO,

CREDIT SUISSE AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH, as Administrative Agent and Collateral Agent,

CREDIT SUISSE LOAN FUNDING LLC, BMO CAPITAL MARKETS CORP..

and

TD SECURITIES (USA) LLC as Joint Lead Arrangers and Joint Bookrunners,

BMO CAPITAL MARKETS CORP.,

and

TD SECURITIES (USA) LLC as Syndication Agents,

and

FIFTH THIRD BANK,

as Documentation Agent





Debtors' Ex. 361 (ECF No. 933)



THEO KWON

# APOLLO

- Q. And in [Mitel], the lenders there uptiered their existing debt holdings into debt that was structurally senior through an exchange. Right?
- **A.** That's my understanding, except for the term 'structurally senior.' Just senior. . . .
- Q. You would agree with me that Apollo received financial benefits in the [Mitel] transaction it participated in that excluded lenders did not receive?
- A. To my understanding, yes.

Trial Tr. 5/18 AM 123:15–24 (ECF No. 967)

#### CREDIT AGREEMENT

Dated as of October 11, 2018

among

ENTERPRISE INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS INC., as Holdings,

#### ENTERPRISE MERGER SUB INC.,

as Merger Sub and, at any time prior to the consummation of the Acquisition, the Borrower,

#### ENVISION HEALTHCARE CORPORATION.

as the Company and, upon and at any time after the consummation of the Acquisition, the Borrower,

The Lenders from Time to Time Party Hereto, and

CREDIT SUISSE AG, CAYMAN ISLANDS BRANCH,

as the Administrative Agent and the Collateral Agent








THEO KWON

# APOLLO

Trial Tr. 5/18 AM 115:13–116:1 (ECF No. 967)

- Q. With respect to Envision Apollo participated in an uptier debt exchange transaction involving Envision Healthcare. Correct?
- A. Correct.
- Q. And a majority of the creditors amended the parties' existing agreements to permit issuance of new senior priming debt in that case. Right?
- **A.** As I understand, yes.
- Q. That amendment had been negotiated with holders of a majority of Envision's first lien term loan facility. Right?
- **A.** As I I believe so.
- Q. And the participating lenders in that instance, including Apollo, put in new money. Right?
- **A.** Yes. . . .



Debtors' Ex. 360 (ECF No. 932-1) at 3

Case 23-90020 Document 859-14 Filed in TXSB on

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF T HOUSTON DIVISION

In re:	:	Chap
SERTA SIMMONS BEDDING, LLC, et al., Debtors.		Case
		(Join
SERTA SIMMONS BEDDING, LLC, et al.,	- :	
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants,		Adve
v.	- 1	
AG CENTRE STREET PARTNERSHIP L.P., et al.,	:	
Defendants, Counterclaim Plaintiffs and Third-Party Plaintiffs,	:	
v.		
AGF FLOATING RATE INCOME FUND, et al.,		
Third-Party Defendants.		

#### RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFFS' JOINT SECOND SET OF INTERR

Pursuant to Rules 9014, 7026, and 7033 of the Federal Procedure, and Rules 26 and 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedu Local Rules of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern I Rules"), defendants AG Centre Street Partnership L.P., AG Credit So Fund, L.P., AG SW Master (L.), L.P., AG Super Fund Master, L.P., an L.L.C. (collectively, "Angelo Gordon"), by and through their undersi following responses and objections (each, a "Response and Objections" Responses and Objections") to the Second Set of Interrogatories to I

Debtors' Exhibit No. 316 Page 1 of 15

#### The Envision/AmSurg Transaction


In April 2022, Envision Healthcare Corporation ("Envision") designated its subsidiary AmSurg, LLC ("AmSurg") as "unrestricted" for purposes of Envision's existing indebtedness. Funds managed by Angelo Gordon (along with other lenders) loaned approximately \$1.1 billion to AmSurg, LLC (the "AmSurg First Lien Facility"). At that time, certain Angelo Gordon-managed collateralized loan obligations ("CLOs") that did not participate in the new money loan owned approximately \$14 million of Envision loans and sold those loans to Envision for cash at the prevailing market price at the time they agreed to the trade (a discount to par).

Also in April 2022, certain other lenders to Envision (the "AmSurg Second Lien Lenders") loaned additional amounts to AmSurg on a second lien basis. Angelo Gordon understands that the proceeds of these loans were lent by AmSurg to Envision, which in turn used the funds to repurchase Envision loans held by the AmSurg Second Lien Lenders for cash at a discount to par. Angelo Gordon did not own Envision loans at such time and did not participate in these transactions but refers to them here in the interest of full disclosure. The





#### Parties Understood PETs Were Possible And Permitted



Debtors' Ex. 317 (ECF No. 859-15) at 4

### Case PT200 Lenders Closing Argument of 70




# Decisions "made for a legitimate business purpose" do not violate implied covenant.

State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 170 (2d Cir. 2004)

So long as the party acts "consistent with its rights under the contract," it may "act in its own self-interest."

Citibank, N.A. v. United Subcontractors, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

#### Case 23-09001 Business Filed in TXSF on 05/25/23 Page 40 of 70



#### Case 23-09001 Business Justification Page 41 of 70



**PHILIP YARROW** 

"[T]he only reason why we put that deal in front of the company was to essentially stop them from doing the Gamut transaction."



Trial Tr. 5/17 PM 115:9–11 (ECF No. 966)

#### Case 23-09001 Business Justification Page 42 of 70



ANDREW N. SVEEN



Trial Tr. 5/17 AM 117:3–7

"But here, because we were being backed into the corner a bit and having to come up with a more—a competitive alternative, we were being forced to realize a 25-cent hit up front on our principal, and that's the part that was tough for me to swallow."

#### Case 23-09001 Business Justification Page 43 of 70

January 25, 2020	Angelo Gordon and PJT begin formulating PET proposal.
March 4, 2020	Angelo Gordon proposes PET to Company's sponsor.
Early – Mid-April 2020	Rumors swirl that certain first lien lenders and third parties are negotiating with the Company to provide new money financing.
April 24, 2020	PTL Lender Group offers new money financing proposal to the Company.
Mid-May 2020	PTL Lender Group and advisors go under NDA; learn Company is seeking to delever and that other lenders are offering to sell debt at a discount.
May 22-26, 2020	PTL Lender Group analyzes effects of alternative transaction and contemplates a proposal in response.
May 26, 2020	PTL Lender Group proposes defensive PET.
June 4, 2020	After extensive negotiations, PTL Lender Group and Company agree to a transaction.

#### Case 23-09001 Business Justification Page 44 of 70



ANDREW N. SVEEN



Trial Tr. 5/17 AM 108:20–23 (ECF No. 964) "I was disappointed, and primarily in the fact that we were going to have to forego so much principal in [order] to counter the other transaction to be somewhat competitive with our offering to the company."

#### Case 23-09001 Business Filed in TXSF on 05/25/23 Page 45 of 70

Case 23-90020 Document 863-42 \*SEALED\* Filed in TXSB on 05/12/23 Page 1 of 6

Date: Sunday, May 24 2020 09:38 PM
Subject: RE: Serta Simmons Bedding, LLCMoney/Discounted 1L Exchange into
From: Yarrow, Philip

To: Egan, Kevin T < Kevin.Egan@inves <\*NY-HYLPMS@invesco.com>;

generally moving forward.

From: Egan, Kevin T < Kevin Egan@invesco.com
Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 4:26 PM
To: Yarrow, Philip < Philip. Yarrow@invesco.com

HYLPMS@invesco.com> Subject: RE: Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC - Need Exchange into Priming Facility Proposal

Thanks, Phil- do you need anything else from us

On May 24, 2020 at 4:42:20 PM EDT, Yarrow, Phi Yeah, I tend to agree. Thanks Dave. I'll keep ye

Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 12:32 PM
To: Yarrow, Philip < Philip < Yarrow@invesco.co
HYLPMS@Invesco.com>
Subject: RE: Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC - Nes
11. Exchanse into Primins Facility Proposal

Thanks Phil. Without knowing what the pricin tranche, the exchange rates and the impact or FO/LO structure makes more sense. As you po as that rate isn't overwhelmingly attractive.

Pricing- Lagree it seems low, but the risk of ger something lower than we otherwise would. I horrible compensation for the risks involved.

From: Yarrow, Philip < Philip Yarrow@investo.
Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2020 4:14 PM
To: Lukkes, David < David, Lukkes@investo.com
Subject: RE: Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC - Nex

1L Exchange into Priming Facility Proposal

Thanks for your feedback. I bolded a paragrap

Redact

From: Lukkes, David < David. Lukkes@invesco.com >

Sent: Sunday, May 24, 2020 12:32 PM

To: Yarrow, Philip < Philip. Yarrow@invesco.com >; Egan, Kevin T < Kevin. Egan@invesco.com >; \*NY- HYL PMS < \*NY-

HYLPMS@invesco.com>

**Subject**: RE: Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC - Need any IC Feedback on Potentially Putting Together a New Money/Discounted 1L Exchange into Priming Facility Proposal

Thanks Phil. Without knowing what the pricing differential looks like for a FO/LO structure versus a large super priority tranche, the exchange rates and the impact on the recovery scenarios it's a little hard to say, but my inclination is that the FO/LO structure makes more sense. As you point out, it protects our new money and at L+550/600 we need to be protected as that rate isn't overwhelmingly attractive.

Pricing- Lagree it seems low, but the risk of getting our collateral taken away puts us in the position of likely having to accept something lower than we otherwise would. The FO piece (if that's the ultimate structure) will be 1x levered so it's not horrible compensation for the risks involved.

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY Highly Confidential

Debtors' Exhibit No. 149 Page 1 of 6 LCMvSerta\_Invesco\_0001593 SSB\_ADVERSARY00153828

Debtors' Ex. 149 (ECF No. 863-42) at 1

#### Case 23-09001 Business Justification Page 46 of 70



**PHILIP YARROW** 



Trial Tr. 5/17 PM 120:17–21 (ECF No. 966) "I think looking at it now, we certainly did benefit, but at the time, it was really hard to say. We were taking a very large discount on our loan, and we were kind of forced to do that as a defensive measure to stop the alternative transaction, which would have, in our opinion, have been, you know, very bad for us."

#### As The Debt Recovered, Looked Like A Bad Decision



#### Case 23-09001 Business Justification Page 48 of 70



ANDREW N. SVEEN



Trial Tr. 5/17 AM 127:7–9; 127:18–22 (ECF No. 964)

"I think there was plenty of time to reflect and second guess, and that was especially true in the fall, as we entered the fall and things started opening more."

\* \* \*

"Like, boy, did I pull the trigger on . . . the loss of 26 cents on the dollar, . . . and we could have got 100, we could have got our full principal back. So, at that time, there was some second-guessing."

#### Counterclaim Defendants: No Evidence

#### **300+ Funds**

AGE FLOATING RATE INCOME FUND BRIGHTHOUSE FUNDS TRUST I -BRIGHTHOUSE/EATON VANCE FLOATING RATE PORTEOURO CALVERT MANAGEMENT SERIES. PORTOLIO, CALVERT MANAGEMENT SERIES -CALVERT FLOATING-RATE ADVANTAGE FUND, EATON VANCE CLO 2013-1 LTD., EATON VANCE CLO 2014-1R LTD., EATON VANCE CLO 2015-1 LTD., EATON VANCE CLO 2018-1 LTD. EATON VANCE LO 2019-1 LTD., EATON VANCE LOAN HOLDING JMITED, EATON VANCE FLOATING-RATE INCOME PLUS FUND. EATON VANCE FLOATING RATE 2022 TARGET TERM TRUST, EATON VANCE SENIOR FLOATING-RATE TRUST, EATON VANCE FLOATING-RATE INCOME TRUST, EATON VANCE INTERNATIONAL (CAYMAN ISLANDS) ELOATING INTERNATIONAL (CATBLEN ISLANDS) FLOATING-RATE INCOME PORTPOLIO, EATON VANCE SENIOR INCOME TRUST, EATON VANCE SHORT DURATION DIVERSIFIED INCOME FUND, EATON VANCE INSTITUTIONAL SENIOR LOAN FUND, EATON INCOME FUND. EATON VANCE FLOATING RATI PORTFOLIO, SENIOR DERT PORTFOLIO, FATON REINSURANCE LTD. RENAISSANCE INVESTMENT REIRSURANCE LID., REPAISSANCE ENVESTBEN HOLDINGS LTD., CALIFORNIA STATE TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, DOLLAR SENIOR LOAN FUND, LTD., DOLLAR SENIOR LOAN MASTER FUND IL LTD. BA/CSCREDIT 1 LLC. PK-SSL INVESTMENT FUND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, COPPERHILL LOAN FUND I, LLC, THE EATON CORPORATION MASTER RETIREMENT TRUST, ERIE INDEMNITY COMPANY, MADISON FLINTHOLM SENIOR LOAN FUND I DAC, PHILLIPS 66 RETIREMENT PLAN TRUST, WIND RIVER FUND LLC, BLUE SHIELD OF CALIFORNIA, ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, THE CITY OF NEW YORK GROUP TRUST, MARYLAND STATE RETIREMENT AND PENSION SYSTEM, CREDIT SUISSE FLOATING RATE TRUST, CREDIT SUISSE FLOATING RATE HIGH INCOME FUND, CREDIT SUSSE STRATEGIC INCOME FUND, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA TREASURY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF NEW MEXICO STATE INVESTMENT COUNCIL. FUND, BENTHAM STRATEGIC LOAN FUND, TELSTRA SUPERANNUATION SCHEME, WESPATH FUNDS TRUST, INFLATION PROTECTION FUND-SERIES, MADISON PARK FUNDING X, LTD, MADISON PARK FUNDING XI, LTD, MADISON PARK FUNDING XII, LTD, MADISON PARK FUNDING XII, LTD, MADISON PARK FUNDING VIII. LTD. MADISON PARK FUNDING XIV, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XV, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XVI, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XVII, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XVIII, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XIX, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XX, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XXI, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XXII, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XXIII, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XXIV, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XXV, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XXVI, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING YXVII LTD. MADISON PARK FUNDING XXVII, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XXIX, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XXX, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XXXI, LTD., MADISON PARK EUNDING VVVII 1 TO MADISON PARK PARK FUNDING XXXII, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XXXIV, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XXXV, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XXXVII, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XL, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XLI, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XLII, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XLIII, LTD., MADISON PARK FUNDING XLIV LTD. ONE FLEVEN FUNDING LLTD. ONE ELEVEN FUNDING II, LTD., BARINGS GLOBAL LOAN LIMITED, BARINGS GLOBAL SPECIAL SITUATIONS CREDIT 3 S.A.R.L., BARINGS GLOBAL BARINGS U.S. LOAN LIMITED, BARINGS CLO LTD. 2018-III, BARINGS CLO LTD. 2017-I, BARINGS CLO LTD. 2019-II, BARINGS CLO LTD. 2016-I, BARINGS CLO LTD. 2015-I, BARINGS CLO LTD. 2016-II, BARINGS CLO LTD. 2018-I, BARINGS CLO LTD. 2015-II, BARINGS CLO LTD. 2013-I, BARINGS CLO LTD 2018-IV BALOISE SENIOR SECURED LOAN FUND, BAYVK R2-FONDS SEMION SECURED LOAN FUND, BAYVK R2-FONDS SEGMENT BAYVK R2 BARINGS, CROWN MANAGED ACCOUNTS SPC-CROWN/BA 2 SP, BABSON CLO LTD. 2014-1, G.A.S.

(CAYMAN) LIMITED SERENGETL/LOAN EUND) A

SERIES TRUST OF THE MULTI STRATEGY UMBRELLA FUND CAYMAN, BARINGS GLOBAL MILTLEREDIT STRATEGY LIMITED BARING GLOBAL MULTI-CREDIT STRATEGY 2 LIMITED, BARINGS GLOBAL MULTI-CREDIT STRATEGY 3 STRATEGY 4 LIMITED, BARINGS BDC SENIOR FUNDING I, LLC, BARINGS GLOBAL FLOATING RATE FUND, A SERIES OF BARINGS FUND TRUST BARINGS SEGREGATED LOANS 3 S.A.R.L. BARINGS BDC, INC., BARINGS GLOBAL LOAN AND HIGH YIELD BOND LIMITED, BARINGS GLOBAL CREDIT INCOME OPPORTUNITIES FUND, ARROWOOD INDEMNITY COMPANY, ARROWOOD INDEMNITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PENSION PLAN OF ARROWOOD INDEMNITY, JOCASSEE PARTNERS LLC, FIRST EAGLE BANK LOAN SELECT MASTER FUND FIRST FAGUE SENIOR LOAN FUND (FSUE) KVK CLO 2013-1 LTD., KVK CLO 2016-1 LTD., KVK CLO 2018-1 LTD., RUSSELL ABSOLUTE RETURN FIXED INCOME FUND, RUSSELL FLOATING RATE FUND, RUSSELL GLOBAL UNCONSTRAINED BOND POOL, RUSSELL MULTI-ASSET CORE PLUS FUND, RUSSELL UNCONSTRAINED TOTAL RETURN FUND, STANIFORD STREET CLO LTD., STICHTING PENSIOENFONDS HOOGOVENS, WIND RIVER 2012 1 CLO LTD., WIND RIVER 2013-1 CLO LTD., WIND RIVER 2013-2 CLO LTD., WIND RIVER 2014-1 CLO LTD., WIND RIVER 2014-2 CLO LTD., WIND RIVER CLO LTD., WIND RIVER 2016-1 CLO LTD., WIND RIVER 2016-2 CLO LTD., WIND RIVER 2017-1 CLO RIVER 2016-2 CLO LLD, WIND RIVER 2017-1 CLO LTD, WIND RIVER 2017-4 CLO LTD, WIND RIVER 2018-3 CLO LTD, WIND RIVER 2019-3 CLO LTD, ANNISA CLO, LTD, BETONY CLO 2, LTD, BOC PENSION INVESTMENT FUND, CARBONE CLO. LTD., DIVERSIFIED CREDIT PORTFOLIO LTD., INVESCO BL FUND, LTD., INVESCO DYNAMIC CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES FUND INVESCO. FLOATING RATE FUND, INVESCO FLOATING RATE INCOME FUND, INVESCO GEMINI US LOAN FUND LLC, INVESCO OPPENHEIMER MASTER LOAN ELIND INVESCO ORDENUEIMED SENIOR ST OATING FUND, INVESCO OPPENHEIMER SENIOR FLOATI RATE FUND, INVESCO OPPENHEIMER SENIOR FLOATING RATE PLUS FUND. INVESCO SENIOR INCOME TRUST, INVESCO SENIOR LOAN FUND, INVESCO SSL FUND LLC, INVESCO ZODIAC FUNDS ZODIAC FUNDS - INVESCO US SENIOR LOAN FUND, KAISER PERMANENTE GROUP TRUST, KAPITALFORENINGEN INVESTIN PRO. US LEVERAGED LOANS I, MILOS CLO, LTD., RECETTE CLO, LTD., RISERVA CLO, LTD., SENTRY INSURANCE COMPANY, UPLAND CLO, LTD., HARBOURVIEW CLO VII-R, LTD.. INVESCO OPPENHEIMER FUNDAMENTAL ALTERNATIVES FUND, OAKTREE OPPORTUNITIES FUND XB HOLDINGS (DELAWARE), LP, OAKTREE OPPS X HOLDCOLTD OAKTREE OPPORTUNITIES FUND ! HOLDINGS (DELAWARE) LP, DRYDEN XXV SENIOR LOAN FUND, DRYDEN XXVI SENIOR LOAN FUND, DRYDEN XXVIII SENIOR LOAN FUND, DRYDEN 30 SENIOR LOAN FUND, DRYDEN 33 SENIOR LOAN FUND, DRYDEN 36 SENIOR LOAN FUND, DRYDEN 37 SENIOR LOAN FUND, DRYDEN 38 SENIOR LOAN FUND DRYDEN 40 SENSOR LOAN FUND, DRYDEN 41 SENIOR LOAN FUND, DRYDEN 42 SENIOR LOAN FUND, DRYDEN 43 SENIOR LOAN FUND, DRYDEN 45 SENIOR LOAN FUND, DRYDEN 47 SENIOR LOAN EUND DRYDEN 40 SENSOR LOAN EUND DRYDEN LTD., DRYDEN 57 CLO, LTD., DRYDEN 58 CLO LTD., DRYDEN 60 CLO, LTD., DRYDEN 61 CLO, LTD., DRYDEN 64 CLO, LTD., DRYDEN 65 CLO, LTD., DRYDEN 70 CLO, LTD., DRYDEN 75 CLO, LTD., NEWARK BSL CLO 1, LTD., NEWARK BSL CLO 2, LTD., VENTURE XXV CLO, LIMITED, VENTURE 31 CLO, LIMITED, VENTURE 32 CLO, LIMITED, VENTURE 35 CLO, LIMITED, VENTURE 35 CLO, LIMITED, VENTURE XVII CLO LIMITED, VENTURE XXII CLO, LIMITED, VENTURE XXIX CLO, LIMITED, VENTURE XXVII CLO, LIMITED, VENTURE 28A CLO, LIMITED, VENTURE XII CLO LIMITED VENTURE VIII CLO LIMITED VENTURI XIV CLO, LIMITED, VENTURE XIX CLO, LIMITED VENTURE XV CLO, LIMITED, VENTURE XVI CLO LIMITED VENTURE XVIII CLO LIMITED VENTURE XX CLO, LIMITED, VENTURE XXI CLO, LIMITED

VENTURE XXX CLO, LIMITED, BSG FUND MANAGEMENT B.V., FIXED INCOME OPPORTUNITIES NEED, LLC, BLACKROCK LIMITED DURATION INCOME TRUST, BLACKROCK GLOBAL INVESTMENT SERIES: INCOME STRATEGIES FORTFOLIO, BLACKROCK CREDIT STRATEGIES INCOME FUND OF BLACKROCK FUNDS V, BLACKROCK SENIOR FLOATING RATE PORTFOLIO, BLACKROCK FLOATING RATE INCOME STRATEGIES FUND, INC., BLACKROCK MULIFASSET INCOME PORTFOLIO OF BLACKROCK FUNDS II, BLACKROCK DEBT STRATEGIES FUND, INC., BLACKROCK FLOATING RATE INCOME TRUST, JPMBI RE BLACKROCK BANKLOAN FUND, BLACKROCK FLOATING RATE INCOME FORTFOLIO OF BLACKROCK FUNDS V, ABR REINSURANCE LTD., NC GARNET FUND, LP, MAGNETITE XC LIMITED MAGNETITE XV LIMITED, MAGNETITE XIV-R, LIMITED, MAGNETITE XVI, LIMITED, MAGNETITE VIII, LIMITED, MAGNETITE XVIII, LIMITED. MAGNETITE XIX, LIMITED, MAGNETITE XX, LIMITED, MAGNETITE XVII, LIMITED, MAGNETITE VII, LIMITED, MAGNETITE XII, LIMITED, NUVEEN DIVERSIFIED DIVIDEND AND INCOME FUND. NUVEEN FLOATING RATE INCOME FUND, NUVEEN FLOATING RATE INCOME OPPORTUNITY FUND, NUVEEN SENIOR INCOME FUND, NUVEEN SHORT DURATION CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES FUND NUVEEN SYMPHONY FLOATING RATE INCOME FUND, PRINCIPAL FUNDS, INC - DIVERSIFIED REAL. ASSET FUND, SYMPHONY CLO XX LTD. SYMPHONY CLO YVILLED SYMPHONY CLO YIY LTD., SYMPHONY CLO XVII, LTD., SYMPHONY CLO XIX LTD., SYMPHONY CLO XVII, LTD., SYMPHONY CLO XV, LTD., SYMPHONY CLO XIV, LTD., SYMPHONY CLO XVI, LTD., TCI-SYMPHONY 2017-1 LTD., TCI-SYMPHONY 2016-1 LTD., SYMPHONY FLOATING RATE SENIOR LOAN FUND, SCOF-2 LTD., BAYCTY ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUNDS SICAV-SIF -BAYCITY US SENIOR LOAN FUND, BAYCITY SENIOR LOAN MASTER FUND LTD., PENSIONDANMARK PENSIONFORSIKRINGSAKTIESELSKAB, MENARD, BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, PRINCIPAL DIVERSIFIED REAL ASSET CIT. CALIFORNI/



### Case PT200 Lenders Closing Argument of 70



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# **Jurisdiction**

Disputes That Impact Creditor Priority Are Core Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(K)

Fixing the order of priority of creditor claims against a debtor is an integral and historic bankruptcy function, and without this power the bankruptcy court would be rendered powerless to rehabilitate a debtor.

*In re Best Prods. Co.,* 68 F.3d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1995)

#### Case 23-0900 Document 216 Filed in JXSB on 05/25/23 Page 53 of 70

Stern exempts claims that would necessarily be "resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor's proof of claim."

Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011)

# Fifth Circuit indicated that § 157(b)(2)(K) proceedings do not "encroach[]" Article III courts after *Stern*.

In re Renaissance Hosp. Grand Prairie Inc., 713 F.3d 285, 294 n.12 (5th Cir. 2013)

#### Consent

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## **Precedent For Transaction**

### Originat Parties Under Stood PETS Were Possible



# Andrew N. Sveen Eaton Vance

INVOLVED IN PAR PURCHASES AT ISSUANCE IN NOV. 2016

- Q. And how would you have characterized the Serta credit agreement on a loose or tight scale that you mentioned?
- A. The -- the Serta credit agreement in 2016 was loose, and the -- the -- you know, that wasn't unusual for that time frame. And you know, it was -- but that was a loose document, yes.



#### PHILIP YARROW

#### **Invesco**

Involved in Par Purchases at Issuance in Nov. 2016

- **Q.** How would you characterize the 2016 credit agreement?
- **A.** I would characterize it as a loose agreement.
- Q. And what's a "loose" agreement?
- A. One that gives the company and the sponsor quite a lot of flexibility as far as its terms are concerned, and in particular there's quite large baskets for making investments or making restricted payments or adding additional debt.

Trial Tr. 5/17 AM 89:1–2, 96:10–15 (ECF No. 964) Trial Tr. 5/17 PM 102:13–14, 103:6-13 (ECF No. 966)

### Apollo Diligences The Possibility Of This PET



#### Serta Simmons Update

- Fund IX has invested \$86 million at cost to purchase \$192 million of Serta's 1st Lien Term Loans (average price of 45), which represents 10% of the 1L class
- As discussed previously, Serta reached out to various lenders for a \$200 million new money and liability management transaction to opportunistically capture debt discount
- Fund IX grouped together w
   However, despite making sig a deal with a cross-holder gr
   Group is led by Eaton Va
   We believe that the grou
   Proposed transaction
   New Money Tranche: \$20
   Exchange Tranche: \$875
   Delivers \$410 million
  - Fund IX's position would be subordinated in the waterfall by the new \$1,075 million super-senior debt
  - A transaction support agreement is in place with 51% of creditors but definitive documents have not yet been finalized.
- This specific risk of amending the waterfall with a majority was extensively diligenced with Paul Weiss during the original distressed debt underwriting and during this current transaction process

### Components Of The Transaction Welf Known To The Market

- Priming Debt
- Debt Repurchases
- Limited Participation
- Amendments by Required Lenders

#### Components Of The Transaction Welf Known To The Market

"And while we never actually engaged in a transaction that had all the exact components, the different components apart have certainly been utilized."

Sveen, Trial Tr. 5/17 AM 124:14-18 (ECF No. 964)

"I don't think it was inconsistent with what we've seen prior and what you might expect."

Meiering, Trial Tr. 5/17 PM 81:9-11 (ECF No. 966)

"Open market purchases [were] very commonplace in transactions and in credit agreements and have been for many years. And these different components all existed."

Sveen, Trial Tr. 5/17 AM 124:19-21 (ECF No. 964) "Yeah, I've seen a transaction structure like this before. Every transaction is unique and so I've never seen a transaction identical to another one in my career, but there have been transactions that have been similar in certain aspects to this one."

Searles, Trial Tr. 5/17 PM 47:13-17 (ECF No. 966)

- **\*Q.** Had you seen transactions like the one you ultimately entered into with Serta before?
- **A.** Certainly ones with similar components."

Yarrow, Trial Tr. 5/17 PM 119:14-16 (ECF No. 966)

"And generally speaking, the transaction that we consummated had component pieces that everyone was very familiar with. I had worked on a number of superpriority financings in other instances. So it was pretty commonplace in the marketplace."

Chopra, Trial Tr. 5/16 PM 200:5-9 (ECF No. 957)

## No Bad Faith

### Cajune 4 UBS Letter IS A Red Herring To



KARN CHOPRA

CENTER VIEW PARTNERS

Trial Tr. 5/17 AM 71:18–24, 72:25–73:4 (ECF No. 964)

- Q. Was it possible that whatever proposal the Angelo Gordon and Apollo, Gamut group was making, might have violated the terms of the credit agreement?
- A. It is.
- Q. But you didn't know, because you didn't know the terms, correct?
- A. Correct.

\* \* \*

- Q. In your view, is there anything inappropriate about sending a letter to make sure that the agent for the lenders focuses on whether a particular transaction is compliant with the terms of the credit agreement?
- A. No.

### Defendants. Offer. P.T.L., Lenders 2\$30, Million **To Abandon Deal With Company**

Case 23-90020 Document 865-5 \*SEALED\* Filed in TXSB on 05/12/23 Page 1 of 6

From: David Sambur <Sambur@apollo.com> Sent: Sat, 6 Jun 2020 16:12:58 -0400 (EDT)

"Evarts, William" <Evarts@pitpartners.com>

"Caiigas, Daniel" <caiigas@nitnartners.com>: "Midha, Ashim" < Midha@nitnartners.com>: Theodore Kwon <tkwon@apollo.com>; Jordan Zaken<zaken@gamutcapital.com>; Rvan Mollett <rmollett@angelogordon.com>; "Greg Ezring" <gezring@paulweiss.com>; Bryce Fraser <BFraser@angelogordon.com>; Michael Kreger <kreger@gamutcapital.com>; Matthew Manin <mmanin@apollo.com>; David Cheon <dcheon@apollo.com>; Lauren Heller <Iheller@apollo.com>; "Brendan McCaffrey" <BMcCaffrey@angelogordon.com>; Austin Kaplan<AKaplan@angelogordon.com>; Michael Hanigan <a href="mailto:hanigan@gamutcapital.com">hanigan@gamutcapital.com</a>; "Ryan Brady" <Brady@gamutcapital.com>: Mark Bernstein MBernstein@angelogordon.com>: Project Sercial Project Sercial apitpartners.com>; "Hermann, Brian S" bhermann@paulweiss.com>; "Janson, Brian M" <bianson@paulweiss.com>; "Jeffrey Saferstein" <jsaferstein@paulweiss.com>; "Clayton, Lewis R\*<lclayton@paulweiss.com>; "Perrin, Andrew" <aperrin@paulweiss.com>; "Witt, Austin" <awitt@paulweiss.com>; Andrew Ehrlich <aehrlich@paulweiss.com>; "Baird, Jamie" <Baird@pjtpartners.com>; "Christopher D.

Moore"<cmoore@angelogordon.com> Subject: Re: [External] RE: [Serta] Group Call

They have a 3 page term sheet that will take 2 weeks to get documented The person on the call said 'I have no idea why they would have told you that you lost with 2 weeks left to document the deal Between now and then the board has a fidaciary obligation to review any superior proposal Roopesh has given PJT guidance on the other deal, so we know what we are shooting for Dan can beln guide us before we propose something

On Jun 6, 2020, at 2:01 PM, Evarts, William <Evarts@pitpartners.com> wrote

#### Updated version below

- Advent has played our two groups off of each other and continues to do so
- We concede that the Gibson/Centerview group has outmaneuvered our group
- However, we don't want to let Advent be the winner
- We are concerned about two outcomes

i. Race to the bottom - while we would rather not, we are being encouraged / are being

#### forced to underbid you]

ii. Litigation - risk that any transaction will result in significant litigation for all parties

PJT SSBADVERSARY-00001183

Outline of offer

CONFIDENTIAL

Debtors' Exhibit No. 212 Page 1 of 6

On Jun 6, 2020, at 2:01 PM, Evarts, William < Evarts@pjtpartners.com> wrote:

- Advent has played our two groups off of each other and continues to do so
- We concede that the Gibson/Centerview group has outmaneuvered our group
- However, we don't want to let Advent be the winners
- We are concerned about two outcomes:

[Race to the bottom – while we would rather not, we are being encouraged / are being

forced to underbid youl

Litigation – risk that any transaction will result in significant litigation for all parties

involved

- Outline of offer
- We will sign a lock-up that ties us all together that Gibson can draft a.
  - The group will only pursue transactions that treat all parties the same and are supported

by the group

- We wait to properly restructure this business
- Payment to Gibson/Centerview Group. Option:
  - Ad Hoc Group purchase of \$200mm of face value at 65 cents, or
  - \$30 million fee paid directly to ad hoc group members

Debtors' Ex. 212 (ECF No. 866-5)

#### Participation Limité d'For Economic Réasons



KARN CHOPRA

CENTER VIEW PARTNERS

Trial Tr. 5/16 PM 178:14–179:3 (ECF No. 957)

"So we felt the need to offer the discount. The only way that you would be comfortable as a lender in conceding discount and crystalizing that discount and not having the ability to earn it back over time is if you were getting a quid pro quo.

The quid pro quo was to be moved into an instrument that, as I said, we would trade better or hopefully recover better in a down side scenario. So in order to do that, you needed to limit the size of the instrument you were exchanging it to.

And by definition, the way to limit the size of that instrument was to limit the participation level. So, unfortunately, the only way to offer the company the discount and really to work the alternative would be to convert, which was being pursued by other lenders at your expense was to limit the size of the [FLSO]..."

Case 23-09001 Document 316 Filed in TXSB on 05/25/23 Page 63 of 70

# 2020 Indemnity

#### Indemnity in the 2020 Agreement Was Reasonable



THEO KWON

Indemnification provisions for the benefit of lenders are "standard in the industry"

APOLLO

Depo. Tr. 119:9–13 (Debtors' Ex. 374, ECF No. 941-2)



#### PHILIP YARROW

"[W]e were already being sued and so we wanted to have some protection about this around that."



Trial Tr. 5/17 PM 116:25–117:1 (ECF No. 966)

# Indemnity: Identical To Angelo Gordon's Envision-AmSurg Transaction

Case 23-90020 Document 865-42 \*SEALED\* Filed in TXSB on 05/12/23 Page 1 of 558

Case 23-90020 Document 889-5 \*SEALED\* Filed in TXSB on 05/14/23 Page 1 of 693

#### **PTL Credit Agreement**

order, preliminary injunction or any similar request for relief); <u>provided</u> that such indemnity shall not (i) (A) as to any Indemnitee, be available to the extent that any such loss, claim, damage, or liability is determined by a final and non-appealable judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction (or documented in any settlement agreement referred to below) to have resulted from the gross negligence, bad faith or willful misconduct of such Indemnitee or (B) as to any Indemnitee (other than the Administrative Agent), be available to the extent such judgment finds (or any such settlement agreement acknowledges) that any such loss, claim, damage, or liability has resulted from such Person's material breach of the Loan Documents (excluding, in each case, for the avoidance of doubt, any Indemnitee's participation in the Exchange Transactions and the Transactions) or (ii) as

CREDIT AGREEMENT
Dated as of April 29, 2022
among
ENTERPRISE INTERMEDIATE HOLDINGS INC.,
ENVISION HEALTHCARE CORPORATION,
AMSURG HOLDCO, LLC,
AMSURG LLC,
as the Borrower,
The Lenders
from Time to Time Party Hereto,

ALTER DOMUS (US) LLC, as the Administrative Agent and the Collateral Agent

UBS AG, STAMFORD BRANCH
as Administrative Agent

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Confidential

SBB\_ADVERSARY00002024

Page 1 of 558

#### **Envision/AmSurg Agreement**

provided that AmSurg Holdings and the Borrower shall have no obligation hereunder to any Indemnified Person with respect to Indemnified Liabilities to the extent arising from (i) the gross negligence or willful misconduct of such Indemnified Person or any of its Related Parties as determined in a final and non-appealable judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction (excluding, in each case, for the avoidance of doubt, arising from any Indemnified Person's participation in the Transactions), (ii) except with respect to the

Debtors' Ex. 252 (ECF No. 865-42) § 9.03(b); Debtors' Ex. 359 (ECF 889-5) §13.5(a)(iii)

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# LCM's Arguments Fall Short

Attempt to retry the failed breach of contract claim

All amendments were made with Required Lenders

- Rejected "Zombified Votes" theory
- Held that there was "no merit" to the argument that superpriority lenders lacked authority to enter into an amendment because they had committed to sell back their loans

In re Murray Energy Holdings Co., 616 B.R. 84, 98 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2020)

### Case 23-09001 Document 316 Siled in TXSB on 05/25/23 Page 69 of 70



09001 Document 316 Filed in TXSB on 05/25/23 Page 70 of 70